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Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz: Constitutionality of Sobriety
Checkpoint Programs
I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court decision in Michigan De-
partment of State Police v. Sitz1 is the Court's first decision
which specifically addresses the constitutionality of sobriety
checkpoint programs.2 The Court held that sobriety checkpoint
programs are facially constitutional.' In reaching this decision,
the Court balanced the state's interest in preventing drunk driv-
ing, the extent to which the checkpoint system can reasonably
be expected to advance that interest, and the degree of objective
and subjective intrusion imposed on the individual drivers dur-
ing the brief stop.' The Sitz decision settled the divergent views
adopted by various state courts5 and established a workable con-
stitutional standard. This decision does, however, open the door
to uncertainties in the administration of the checkpoint
programs.
Part II of this Note examines the Supreme Court's histori-
cal development of the fourth amendment as well as representa-
tive state cases which applied these decisions specifically to the
issue of sobriety checkpoint programs. Part II also examines fed-
eral airport security screening regulations and discusses federal
highway grants which provide funds for drunk driving preven-
tion programs.
Part III is a comprehensive examination of the facts and the
1. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
2. A sobriety checkpoint program provides that the police set up a roadblock, stop
all cars without having any individualized suspicion that a specific driver is intoxicated,
and briefly scrutinize all drivers to determine if they are intoxicated. Id. at 2484.
3. Id. at 2488.
4. Id.
5. See Theresa L. Kruk, Annotation, Validity of Routine Roadblocks by State or
Local Police for Purpose of Discovery of Vehicular or Driving Violations, 37 A.L.R. 4th
10 (1985).
1
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procedural history of Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz and discusses the underlying reasoning of the majority and
the two dissenting opinions.
The analysis in Part IV supports the Court's majority deci-
sion and vigorously attacks the dissenting opinions. It stresses,
however, that the majority did not completely resolve the sobri-
ety checkpoint program issue because clear' checkpoint guide-
lines regarding the operation of the roadblocks were not pro-
vided. As a result, Part IV further suggests a set of model
guidelines and offers a solution to the limited effectiveness of
non-mandatory checkpoint programs.
Part V concludes that the Supreme Court correctly decided
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz and predicts that
standardized sobriety checkpoint guidelines and federal legisla-
tion mandating sobriety checkpoint programs will be necessary
for the programs to be effectively woven into the fabric of the
American lifestyle.
II. Background
A. Historical Development of the Fourth Amendment by the
Supreme Court
1. "Stop and Frisk"
The protective role of the fourth amendment' was ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio,7 where the
Court held that the individual's right to personal security was
not breached by a search and seizure in a "stop and frisk" street
confrontation.' In Terry, a police officer stopped an individual
walking with his companions back and forth on a street.' The
officer became suspicious of their actions and, for his protection,
6. The fourth amendment to the Constitution provides:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8. Id. at 30-31.
9. Id. at 6.
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patted down the individuals' clothing in a weapons search.'" The
Court recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an indi-
vidual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized"
that individual." In determining that the search and seizure was
reasonable, even when probable cause to arrest for a crime was
lacking, the Court balanced the government's interest in crime
prevention and detection'2 against the nature and quality of the
intrusion on individual rights.' 3 Using an objective standard, the
officer, in light of his experience, was permitted to draw specific,
reasonable inferences from the facts but was not allowed to use
hunches based on unparticularized suspicion.' 4
2. Border Patrols
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,'5 the Court held that
the roving Police Border Patrol's stop and search of an automo-
bile at a point removed from the border, made by an officer
without probable cause or consent, for the purpose of detecting
the illegal importation of aliens, violated the fourth amend-
ment.'" The Court reasoned that although the government's in-
terest in deterring unlawful border entry by aliens is a serious
one, the pressures of law enforcement are in constant tension
with the Constitution's protection of the individual against cer-
tain exercises of official power.1 7 These conflicting pressures urge
a "resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards."' 8
10. Id. at 6-7.
11. Id. at 273-75.
12. Id. at 22. The government's interest in crime prevention and detection supports
the "recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appro-
priate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior
even though there is, no probable cause to make an arrest." Id.
13. Id. at 24.
14. Id. at 27. The Terry Court's inquiry into whether the seizure and search was
"unreasonable" focused on "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and
whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the inter-
ference in the first place." Id. at 20. Among others, three factors were considered: (1) a
police officer's observation of unusual conduct; (2) whether the conduct invokes a reason-
able suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot; and (3) the officer's ability to point to
specific and articulable facts to justify that suspicion. Id. at 20-21, 30.
15. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
16. Id. at 273-75.
17. Id. at 273.
18. Id.
1992] SITZ
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In another roving patrol case, United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce,19 officers stopped a car in a border area and questioned
the occupants about their citizenship because the occupants ap-
peared to be of Mexican ancestry.2" The Court stated that the
fourth amendment forbids stopping a vehicle and questioning its
occupants unless the officers have a founded suspicion21 that the
occupants are illegal aliens.22 The Court reasoned that the
state's interest in preventing the illegal entry of aliens was not
strong enough to require interference with highway usage solely
at the discretion of Border Patrol officers.23
In United States v. Ortiz,24 Border Patrol officers stopped a
car for a routine immigration search at a fixed non-border traffic
checkpoint that was closed one-third of the time,25 and where all
northbound traffic was screened.26 The Court held that the stop
must be based on probable cause or consent.2" In distinguishing
fixed checkpoints from roving patrols, the government argued
that roving patrols have unlimited discretion, often operate dur-
ing the evening along seldom-traveled roads, and their approach
19. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
20. Id. at 875.
21. Id. at 884-85 (Factors that may be considered in determining whether there is
reasonable suspicion to stop a car in the border area include: the area's characteristics,
its proximity to the border, the usual traffic patterns on that road, previous experience
with alien traffic, information about the area's recent illegal border crossings, the motor-
ist's physical characteristics and behavior, and the vehicle's overall appearance).
22. Id. at 884 (footnote omitted). "Except at the border and its functional
equivalents, officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific
articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably war-
rant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country." Id.
23. Id. at 882. "We are not convinced that the legitimate needs of law enforcement
require this degree of interference with lawful traffic." Id. at 883.
24. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
25. Id. at 893.
26. Id. If the officer noticed anything suspicious about the vehicle or its occupants
during the screening process which caused him to suspect that aliens may be in the car,
he stopped the car and questioned the occupants about their citizenship; if the officer's
suspicions were not dispelled, he searched the vehicle. Id. at 893-94.
27. Id. at 896-97. In defense of the checkpoint, the government argued that the
probable cause standard is not justified for two reasons: (1) the discretion of the officer
in deciding which vehicles to stop and search is limited by the checkpoint's location as
determined by Border Patrol officials, while roving patrol officers have the authority to
stop and search any vehicle within a certain distance of the border; and (2) the check-
point stop and search operations are far less intrusive than roving patrol stops. Id. at
894.
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may frighten motorists; whereas motorists stopped at fixed traf-
fic checkpoints can see other vehicles being stopped, can ascer-
tain the officer's authority, and are less likely to be frightened or
annoyed by the stop. 8 The Ortiz Court disregarded the govern-
ment's argument, however, and reasoned that the greater regu-
larity of the stop does not mitigate the invasion of privacy that a
search entails, and the procedures of a fixed checkpoint do not
significantly reduce the likelihood of embarrassment to the mo-
torist. 9 The Court, also troubled by the amount of discretion
the officers had at the checkpoint in choosing which vehicles to
stop, decided that this degree of discretion30 is inconsistent with
the fourth amendment and stated that probable cause is the
minimum requirement for a lawful search.31
In a subsequent case, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,3 2
the Supreme Court held that a routine stop limited to no more
than brief questioning at a non-border permanent checkpoint,
comported with the fourth amendment without requiring indi-
vidualized suspicion.3 3 The Court recognized that reasonable
suspicion was not a practical standard to employ on major in-
land routes which smugglers are known to use, because the
heavy traffic would not allow for a particularized study of a
given car to identify illegal aliens and would not deter the flow
of well-disguised smuggling operations .3 The Court concluded
that the government's interest in stopping the smuggling of ille-
gal aliens was great, the intrusion was very limited, and interfer-
ence with legitimate traffic was minimal.3 5 The Martinez-Fuerte
Court distinguished the intrusion on fourth amendment inter-
ests generated by random roving-patrol stops such as the
28. Id. at 894-95.
29. Id. at 895. "Motorists whose cars are searched, unlike those who are only ques-
tioned, may not be reassured by seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars as
well. Where only a few are singled out for a search . .. motorists may find the searches
especially offensive." Id.
30. Id. at 895-96. "[W]e are not persuaded that the checkpoint limits to any mean-
ingful extent the officer's discretion to select cars for search." Id. at 895.
31. Id. at 896.
32. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
33. Id. at 562. For a detailed discussion of the Martinez-Fuerte decision, see Jeffrey
J. Bouslog, Note, Exploring the Constitutional Limits of Suspicionless Seizures: The
Use of Roadblocks to Apprehend Drunken Drivers, 71 IowA L. REV. 577, 599-605 (1986).
34. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557.
35. Id. at 556-59.
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Brignoni-Ponce random suspicionless stops near the border and
the Almeida-Sanchez random suspicionless stops at an area re-
moved from the border, from the intrusion caused by the Marti-
nez-Fuerte routine permanent checkpoint stops.3 6 As a result,
the Court held that the subjective intrusion of generating con-
cern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers is appreciably
less at routine permanent checkpoint stops than at random
stops. 7
3. Random Discretionary Stops Without Procedures
In Delaware v. Prouse,38 a patrolman in a police cruiser,
without following standards, guidelines, or procedures relating to
document spot-checks, stopped an automobile without having
observed traffic violations, automobile equipment violations, or
suspicious behavior.39 The Court held that a random discretion-
ary stop to check for a driver's license and car registration with-
out probable cause or reasonable suspicion was inconsistent with
the fourth amendment." After balancing the government's legit-
imate interest in promoting law enforcement against the individ-
ual's interest in being free from the intrusions forbidden by the
fourth amendment, "1 the Court reasoned that the marginal con-
tribution to roadway safety possibly resulting from spot-checks
cannot justify subjecting all automobile occupants on the roads
to seizures42 "at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement offi-
36. Id. at 555-58. In checkpoint stops, as well as roving-patrol stops, neither the
vehicle nor its occupants are searched and visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to
what can be seen without a search. However, the surrounding circumstances, including
the element of surprise at a random roving-patrol stop, is perceived as more threatening
and intrusive than at a permanent checkpoint stop. Id. at 558. The Martinez-Fuerte
permanent checkpoint location was equipped with advance warning signs, flashing lights,
orange traffic safety cones to funnel traffic into two lanes, floodlights for nighttime oper-
ations, and the Border Patrol agents were dressed in full uniform. Id. at 545-46.
37. Id. at 558.
38. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
39. Id. at 650.
40. Id. at 663.
41. Id. at 654.
42. Id. at 659. "Given the alternative mechanisms available, both those in use and
those that might be adopted, we are unconvinced that the incremental contribution to
highway safety of the random spot check justifies the practice under the Fourth Amend-
ment." Id.
[Vol. 12:445
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cials."" However, the Prouse dicta alluded to limiting the hold-
ing to the type of spot-checks discussed in the case and stated
that "[t]his holding does not preclude . . . States from develop-
ing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that
do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion."" The
Court suggested as an alternative, the "[q]uestioning of all on-
"945coming traffic at roadblock-type stops ....
Another type of case involved the random stopping of a pe-
destrian. In Brown v. Texas," one of two police officers cruising
in a patrol car got out and stopped a man strolling down an alley
and asked the man to identify himself because he looked suspi-
cious, although the officers did not suspect the man of specific
misconduct.47 The Court held that where there is no procedure
containing explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of indi-
vidual officers, the balance between the public's interest and the
individual's right to personal security and privacy favors free-
dom from police interference in the absence of any objective ba-
sis for suspecting misconduct.48 The Court stated that the fourth
amendment guarantees do not permit an arbitrary stop based on
less than objective criteria.49
In the Court's analysis of seizures less intrusive than tradi-
tional arrests, it used a three-prong balancing test which
weighed: (1) the gravity of the public concerns served by the
seizure ("Public Interest" prong); (2) the degree to which the
seizure advances the public interest ("Effectiveness" prong); and
(3) the severity of the interference imposed on individual liberty
("Intrusion on Individual Liberty" prong).50
43. Id. at 661.
44. Id. at 663 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. For a commentary on the effect of the Prouse dicta, see Lazaro Fernandez,
Comment, DUI Roadblocks: Drunk Drivers Take a Toll on the Fourth Amendment, 19
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 983, 1002-1004 (1986).
46. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
47. Id. at 48-49.
48. Id. at 50-51. In this case, the criteria were not neutral. Therefore, "[i]n the ab-
sence of any basis for suspecting ... misconduct, the balance between the public interest
and ... [the individual's] right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom
from police interference." Id. at 52.
49. Id. "When such a stop is not based on objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary and
abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits." Id.
50. Id. at 50-51.
SITZ1992]
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4. Drug and Alcohol Screening Programs
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,5" the Fed-
eral Railroad Administration promulgated regulations for indus-
try safety standards in light of evidence indicating that alcohol
and drug abuse by railroad employees had been a contributing
factor in a number of significant train accidents. 2 The Court up-
held the regulations which mandated drug and alcohol testing of
railroad employees.5 The Court explained that the tests were
reasonable under the fourth amendment although there was
neither a probable cause requirement nor reasonable suspicion
that a particular employee might be impaired .5 The compelling
government interests served by the testing - that of ensuring
the safety of the traveling public and the employees themselves,
and of preventing accidents and casualties in railroad opera-
tions - outweighed the employees' privacy concerns.5 5 The
Court reasoned that the government interests presented " 'spe-
cial needs' beyond normal law enforcement that justif[ied] a de-
parture from the usual warrant and probable cause require-
ments. '56 Also, the Court stated that where individual privacy
interests are minimal and where an important governmental in-
terest would be jeopardized by a requirement of individualized
suspicion, a search may be reasonable without such suspicion."'
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,58 the
Court upheld the implementation of the United States Customs
Service's drug-testing program which required that employees
applying for promotion to positions involving the interdiction of
51. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
52. Id. at 606-07. Regulations were issued under the statutory authority of the Sec-
retary of Transportation pursuant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970. Id. at 606.
See Control of Alcohol and Drug Use, 49 C.F.R. § 219 (1990).
53. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 620-21.
56. Id. at 620 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987)). The Skin-
ner Court examined the government's interest in ensuring safety by comparing the gov-
ernment's regulation of railroad employees' conduct with its supervision of probationers,
regulated industries, government offices, schools, and prisons. Id.
57. Id. at 624. The Court explained that "a showing of individualized suspicion is
not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable." Id.
58. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
[Vol. 12:445
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illegal drugs or the carrying of firearms submit urine samples. 9
The Court held that the testing was reasonable despite the ab-
sence of a requirement of probable cause or some level of indi-
vidualized suspicion. 0 It explained that the privacy interests of
employees seeking promotions were outweighed by both the gov-
ernment's interest in protecting citizens"1 from the use of deadly
force by persons with impaired perceptions and judgment,62 and
its interest in the law enforcement crisis caused by the smug-
gling of illicit narcotics.6 3
The Court, in its analysis, discussed the government prac-
tice of searching all passengers and their carry-on luggage prior
to boarding commercial airliners without requiring individual-
ized suspicion. ' The Court observed that the risk to hundreds
of lives and to millions of dollars of property caused by the pi-
rating or exploding of large airplanes meets the reasonableness
test if: (1) it is a good-faith search designed for the purpose of
preventing hijacking or like damage; (2) the scope of the search
is reasonable; and (3) the passenger has been given advance no-
tice of the search so that he can avoid it by not traveling by
59. Id. at 677. After this case was decided by the Court of Appeals in National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), the Supreme
Court determined that the Customs Services' program must conform to the regulations
governing certain federal employee drug testing programs promulgated by the United
States Department of Health and Human Services. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 661-62 n.1.
See also Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs, 53 Fed.
Reg. 11, 979 (1988).
60. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679. The Court reaffirmed the "principle that neither a
warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an
indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance." Id. at 665.
61. Id. at 679.
62. Id. at 670-71. "[Einsuring against the creation of this dangerous risk will itself
further Fourth Amendment values, as the use of deadly force may violate the Fourth
Amendment in certain circumstances." Id. at 671.
63. Id. at 668.
64. Id. at 675 n.3. In 1978, Federal Regulations were promulgated requiring that
each airport regularly serving scheduled passenger operations under a Federal Aviation
Administration operating certificate or regularly serving scheduled passenger operations
of a foreign air carrier adopt and carry out a security program that provides for the
safety of persons and property traveling in air transportation and intrastate air transpor-
tation against acts of criminal violence and aircraft piracy. Airport Security, 14 C.F.R. §
107 (1990); Airplane Operator Security, 14 C.F.R. § 108 (1990) (providing that no person
may enter a controlled access area without submitting to the screening of that person's
property in accordance with the procedures being applied to that area).
9
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B. Divergent State Court Views on the Constitutionality of
Sobriety Checkpoint Programs
Many states have established sobriety checkpoint programs
that have been challenged in the courts. The courts, in holding
sobriety checkpoint programs either constitutional or unconsti-
tutional, have relied upon the dicta in Delaware v. Prouse,"6 or
the three-prong balancing test in Brown v. Texas,67 or variations
of that test.6 8 In addition, the theme common to most of the
cases was the existence or nonexistence of checkpoint program
guidelines. 9 The representative cases discussed in this section
illustrate those divergent views.
1. Reliance on the Delaware v. Prouse 70 Dicta
The Prouse Court limited its holding by articulating its cel-
ebrated dicta: "This holding does not preclude the State of Del-
aware or other states from developing methods for spot checks
that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the uncon-
strained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traf-
fic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative. '7 1 Courts
have relied upon this dicta as authority for establishing fixed so-
briety checkpoints to detect drunk drivers.7
In Kinslow v. Commonwealth," the court applied the
65. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496,
500 (2d Cir. 1974)).
66. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 44-45; see infra notes
71-76 and accompanying text (state courts relying on Prouse dicta).
67. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). See supra text accompanying note 50; see infra notes 88-136
and accompanying text (state courts relying on Brown balancing test).
68. See infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text (state courts applying variations of
Brown balancing test).
69. See infra notes 83-87, 94-96 and accompanying text (checkpoint program guide-
lines were considered).
70. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
71. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
72. SEE infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. "The evil implicit in the use by
police of standardless and unbridled discretion to stop vehicles, which has been prohib-
ited by Prouse, simply is not present here." State v. Coccomo, 427 A.2d 131 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1980).
73. 660 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1105 (1984).
[Vol. 12:445
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Prouse dicta and held that the roadblock established by the
Kentucky State Police and the Warren County Sheriff's Depart-
ment did not violate the appellant's constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.7 ' The roadblock
was conducted without permitting the "unconstrained discre-
tion" condemned in Prouse.76 Unlike Prouse, where the officers
used their discretion to choose which vehicles to stop for a spot
check, in Kinslow, all vehicles were stopped. 6
2. Reliance on a Two-Prong Balancing Test
In addition to the Prouse dicta, state courts, in considering
the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints, have also relied on
a balancing test which weighs the government's interest in curb-
ing drunk driving against the intrusion on the individual at the
checkpoint. These courts have upheld the constitutionality of
the checkpoint when the state showed that guidelines limited
the officers' discretion. 7 In doing so, the courts adopted the first
prong ("Public Interest") and third prong ("Intrusion on Indi-
vidual Liberty") of the balancing test in Brown v. Texas,18 and
also required assurances against randomness and arbitrariness
present in Delaware v. Prouse.79
In Commonwealth v. Trumble,80 the court applied the first
and third prongs of Brown, and in considering the significance of
the second prongs ("Effectiveness") the court mentioned that
the effectiveness of "traditional methods" of law enforcement
had failed. 1 Also, the checkpoints were a factor in apprehending
74. Id. at 678.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See State v. Golden, 318 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Commonwealth v.
Trumble, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (Mass. 1985); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 337 S.E.2d 273 (Va.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986).
78. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). The Brown three-prong balancing test weighed: (1) the grav-
ity of the public concerns served by the seizure; (2) the degree to which the seizure ad-
vanced the public interest; and (3) the severity of interference imposed upon individual
liberty. Id. See supra text accompanying note 50.
79. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 43-44. The need for
neutral limitations was also discussed in Brown, 443 U.S. at 51. See supra text accompa-
nying note 48.
80. 483 N.E.2d at 1102 (Mass. 1985).
81. Id. at 1105 (no need to show that there is no alternative that would be as effec-
tive as roadblocks or less intrusive than roadblocks). "Each year, over 25,000 people die
19921 SITZ
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drunk drivers.82
Trumble demonstrated that the checkpoint stops were con-
stitutional because they were administered without discretion, in
accordance with written guidelines employing neutral criteria.
8 3
However, in Trumble, although the state employed appropriate
guidelines, the concurring opinion stressed that certain "stan-
dardized" guidelines must exist:
Although "there is no 'typical' sobriety checkpoint roadblock,"..
[the following criteria] must exist: "(1) a checkpoint or road-
block location selected for its safety and visibility to oncoming
motorists; (2) adequate advance warning signs, illuminated at
night, timely informing approaching motorists of the nature of
the impending intrusion; (3) uniformed officers and official vehi-
cles in sufficient quantity and visibility to 'show . . . the police
power of the community'; and (4) a predetermination by policy-
making administrative officers of the roadblock location, time,
and procedures to be employed, pursuant to carefully formulated
standards and neutral criteria. 84
The courts did not, however, discuss the necessity or effective-
ness of sobriety checkpoints as a law enforcement tool. In con-
trast to Trumble and other cases, a number of state courts ap-
in traffic accidents in which alcohol consumption is involved." Id. at 1105-06 (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 867, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3367). "This total represents approximately half of the deaths resulting from motor vehi-
cle accidents which occur on our nation's roads each year." Id. at 1106. See also Lowe,
337 S.E.2d 273, 277 ("tangible results appeared that were not evident under traditional
methods of detection").
82. Trumble, 483 N.E.2d at 1105. From approximately 11:30 P.M. on July 2, 1983,
to approximately 2 A.M. on July 3, 1983, 503 vehicles were stopped at the roadblock;
sixteen drivers were detained for further checking, and eight drivers were arrested. Id.
See also Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 277 (drunk drivers detected at lower blood alcohol content
levels than had been detected using routine patrols).
83. Trumble, 483 N.E.2d at 1104 (roadblock conducted in manner consistent with
guidelines and training sessions); State v. Golden, 318 S.E.2d 693, 695 (Ga. Ct. App.
1984) ("operation was carried out pursuant to specific, pre-arranged procedures requiring
all passing vehicles to be stopped at the checkpoint and leaving no discretion to the
officers in this regard."); Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 277 (plan employed use of procedural man-
ual setting forth site selection, provisions for manning and equipping site, details for
stopping and interviewing motorists, and evaluating motorists suspected of driving while
intoxicated).
84. Trumble, 483 N.E.2d at 1110-11 (Abrams, J., concurring) (quoting Lance D.
Rogers, The Drunk-Driving Roadblock: Random Seizure or Minimal Intrusion?, 21
CrIM. L. BULL. 197, 204 (1985)) (citations omitted).
[Vol. 12:445
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plied the first ("Public Interest") and third ("Intrusion on
Individual Liberty") prongs of the Brown balancing test85 and
held that the sobriety checkpoints were unconstitutional."
These courts suggested that if sufficiently precise guidelines had
been followed, as in Trumble, they would have found the check-
points constitutional. 7 Again, as in the cases above, there was
no meaningful discussion in these cases concerning the necessity
or effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints as a law enforcement
tool.
3. Reliance on a Three-Prong Balancing Test
A third manner in which state courts have evaluated the
constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints is by relying on the full
three-prong Brown test.88 In State v. Deskins,89 the court, in ad-
dition to the Brown test9 ° also weighed thirteen enumerated fac-
tors.9 1 The court articulated that the state's purpose for sobriety
85. See supra text accompanying note 50.
86. See State v. Jones, 483 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1986); State v. Crom, 383 N.W.2d 461
(Neb. 1986); State v. Kirk, 493 A.2d 1271 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
87. The Crom court stated that there was no plan formulated at the policymaking
level which considered, weighed, and balanced the Prouse and Brown factors; therefore,
the driver's reasonable expectation of privacy was subject to arbitrary invasion "solely at
the unfettered discretion of officers in the field." 383 N.W.2d at 463. The Jones court
reasoned that "it is essential that a written set of uniform guidelines be issued before a
roadblock can be utilized." 483 So.2d at 438. The Kirk court looked to well-known au-
thority, Professor LaFave, and stated that "[wle also agree with LaFave that it is 'fair to
conclude that a DWI road block is constitutional if properly conducted.'" 493 A.2d at
1279, (quoting 3 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 10.8(g) at 190 (Supp. 1985)).
88. See supra text accompanying note 50.
89. 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan. 1983).
90. See supra text accompanying note 50.
91. The thirteen Deskins factors which should be considered in determining
whether the balance favors the state (though not all of the factors need to be favorable
for the state to prevail) include:
(1) The degree of discretion, if any, left to the officer in the field; (2) the location
designated for the roadblock; (3) the time and duration of the roadblock; (4) stan-
dards set by superior officers; (5) advance notice to the public at large; (6) advance
warning to the individual approaching motorist; (7) maintenance of safety condi-
tions; (8) degree of fear or anxiety generated by the mode of operation; (9) average
length of time each motorist is detained; (10) physical factors surrounding the
location, type and method of operation; (11) the availability of less intrusive
methods for combating the problem; (12) the degree of effectiveness of the proce-
dure; and (13) any other relevant circumstances which might bear upon the test.
Deskins, 673 P.2d at 1185. If law enforcement officials have unbridled discretion, the
checkpoint program would run afoul of Prouse. Id.
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checkpoints is two-fold: (1) to apprehend and remove the drunk
driver from the road before injury or property damage occurs;
and (2) to deter and discourage the potential drunk driver from
driving in the first place.2 The court considered the magnitude
of the injury, the damage caused by the drunk driver, and the
importance of citizens being protected on streets and roadways,
and held that the public interest in properly administered sobri-
ety checkpoints containing appropriate safeguards outweighed
the individual's right to be free from fourth amendment
intrusions."
In other cases 94 applying the Brown three-prong balancing
test,9 5 the court determined that neutral, non-discretionary
guidelines were employed,96 that the state had an important in-
terest, and that the checkpoint stop entailed only a minimum
intrusion on the individual.9 Also, the courts focused on the ef-
fectiveness and/or need for sobriety checkpoints, unlike the
92. Id. at 1182.
93. Id. at 1185.
94. See State v. Superior Ct., 691 P.2d 1073 (Ariz. 1984); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 221
Cal. Rptr. 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 743 P.2d 1299 (Cal. 1987); People v. Bartley,
486 N.E.2d 880 (Ill. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986); Little v. State, 479 A.2d
903 (Md. 1984); State v. Coccomo, 427 A.2d 131 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980); People
v. Scott, 473 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1984).
95. See supra text accompanying note 50.
96. The Ingersoll court concluded that "if a sobriety checkpoint is conducted ac-
cording to the following guidelines, its limited intrusiveness will be far outweighed by its
potential effectiveness and the gravity of the public interest in deterring drunk driving."
Ingersoll, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
In part, the guidelines provided: (1) The decision to establish a sobriety roadblock,
the site selection, and the operational procedures must be made and established by su-
pervisory law enforcement personnel; (2) the field officers must not be permitted to exer-
cise discretion in choosing which motorists to detain, and a mathematical formula may
be used; (3) sobriety checkpoint supervisory personnel must give their first consideration
to safety; (4) the checkpoints must be reasonably located and may be temporary; (5) law
enforcement supervisory personnel must exercise good judgment in determining times
and durations, with the primary consideration being the safety of motorists; (6) the road-
block should have high visibility, including warning signs, flashing lights, flares, police
vehicles, and uniformed officers in attendance; (7) the average time each motorist is de-
tained must be kept to a minimum to reduce intrusiveness of the stop and to avoid
traffic tie-ups; and (8) advance media publicity that sobriety checkpoints are planned
will diminish their intrusiveness and increase their deterrent effect. Ingersoll, 221 Cal.
Rptr. at 667-69.
97. See, e.g., Coccomo, 427 A.2d at 134 n.7 (defendant did not indicate that the stop
of his vehicle or the procedures the police used generated any fright, anxiety, concern or
even annoyance).
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courts in Trumble and analogous cases, which failed to address
this issue. 8
In State v. Coccomo,' 9 the court held that the checkpoint
program was sufficiently productive to qualify as a reasonable
law enforcement procedure because numerous arrests for drunk
driving had resulted since the inception of the program. '10 Simi-
larly, statistics introduced in Little v. State'01 demonstrated
that for the short period of its operation, the checkpoint pro-
gram had been a moderately effective technique for detecting
and deterring the drunk driver.' 2
Further, in People v. Scott,' the court noted that the value
of roadblocks in deterring drunk driving is endorsed by the
United States Department of Transportation and the Governor's
Alcohol and Highway Safety Task Force.' 0 The court reasoned
that it remains unclear whether substantial reductions in deaths,
injuries and damage resulting from drunk driving stem from leg-
islative reforms during that period as distinct from the deterrent
effect of roadblocks and other programs, and held that "[tihe
State is entitled in the interest of public safety to bring all avail-
able resources to bear, without having to spell out the exact effi-
ciency coefficient of each component and of the separate effects
98. See supra text accompanying notes 80-87.
99. 427 A.2d 131 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
100. Id. at 134-35.
101. 479 A.2d 903 (Md. 1984).
102. Id. at 913. For example, in Maryland, there was a seventeen percent decrease in
alcohol related accidents in Harford County compared with the preceding three-month
interval. In contrast, in Frederick County, where the program was not in operation, con-
ventional drunk driving techniques achieved only a twelve percent decrease. Of even
greater significance was the deterrence effect. Police at checkpoints observed that many
drunk individuals had a sober spouse or companion drive instead. Taxi companies re-
ported increased business due to intoxicated persons who had been deterred from driv-
ing. Therefore, the prospect of a roadblock stop convinced some intoxicated persons to
find other means of transportation. Id.
103. 473 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1984).
104. Id. at 4-5. "A 1983 paper on Safety Checkpoints For DWI Enforcement issued
by the Department of Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion's Office of Alcohol Countermeasures emphasizes the importance of informing the
public about DWI checkpoint operations as the chief means of deterring driving while
intoxicated .... " Id. at 4. In addition, "the Governor's Task Force found 'that the
systematic, constitutionally conducted traffic checkpoint is the single most effective ac-
tion in raising the community's perception of the risk of being detected and apprehended
for drunk driving.'" Id. at 4-5.
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of any particular component.' 0 5 In People v. Bartley,10 6 the
court articulated that "the carnage caused by drinking and then
driving is so serious it warrants resort to both types of appre-
hension - stopping automobiles which are being driven errati-
cally and roadblocks to detect drunken drivers before they drive
in an erratic manner.' '10 7
Such sobriety checkpoints have been compared to airport
security procedures. In Ingersoll v. Palmer,08 the court sug-
gested that there is a similarity between the rationale justifying
sobriety checkpoint programs and the rationale justifying air-
port pre-departure screening procedures and concomitant
searches. 09 The court explained that, similar to the deterrence
of hijacking and the detection of potential hijackers, the deter-
rence of drunk driving and the detection of drunk drivers can
also be treated as an "administrative purpose."" 0 The majority
alluded to the fact that the legislation had already implicitly au-
thorized sobriety checkpoint programs."' The Ingersoll dissent
agreed with the majority's analysis but extended their premise
by stating that the legislature, as the elected representatives of
the citizenry, and not the court, should do the balancing to de-
termine if sobriety checkpoint programs further the purpose of
the drunk driving regulatory scheme." 2 The dissent also noted
105. Id. at 6.
106. 486 N.E.2d 880 (Ill. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986).
107. Id. at 886. The court also pointed out that the National Transportation Safety
Board's Safety Study mentions that "sobriety checkpoints are visible aspects that drunk
driving is being combated and they afford police the opportunity to observe a larger
number of motorists than would be possible during typical patrol procedures." Id.
108. 221 Cal. Rptr. 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), afJ'd, 743 P.2d 1299 (1987).
109. Id. at 665. Airport searches and pre-departure screening procedures are part of
a comprehensive regulatory program to insure that dangerous weapons will not be car-
ried onto an airplane and to deter potential hijackers from attempting to board. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. "[Tihere presently exists a legislatively enacted 'general regulatory scheme'
to deter drunk driving. . . . While the Legislature may not have explicitly authorized
sobriety checkpoints as part of its regulatory program to deter drunk driving, the con-
duct of those checkpoints unquestionably furthers that regulatory purpose." Id.
112. Id. at 671-72 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent then went on to state that "a
court should not read silence as a form of authorization." Id. at 672.
The Legislature is also better able to devise a comprehensive, state-wide sobriety
checkpoint program. The majority's balancing test results depend upon deterrence
and upon not unduly burdening or delaying motorists. If only a few municipalities
institute sobriety checkpoints, the majority's predictions about deterrence will not
[Vol. 12:445
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that sobriety checkpoint bills were introduced in the legislature
in two successive years and had died in committee.' 13
a. The "Intrusion on Individual Liberty" (Third Prong
of Brown) Was Not Met
There have also been courts that have applied the same
Brown three-prong balancing test 1 4 utilized in cases like Des-
kins and Ingersoll and yet found the roadblock unconstitutional
because all the prongs were not met. "'15 These courts, in nega-
tively applying the Brown test, have agreed that the states have
an important interest in the eradication and deterrence of drunk
driving, but failed to agree that the intrusion on individual lib-
erty was justified by the effectiveness of the checkpoints as com-
pared to the effectiveness of traditional less intrusive
procedures."'
In State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court," 7 for example,
the court illustrated the spirit of the general rule that a stop and
seizure without founded suspicion seriously jeopardizes the con-
cept of personal liberty:
I ... have often thought that getting killed by some intoxicated
idiot who crossed the median divider and hit me head-on would
be the worst and most senseless way to die.
I mourn for the parents of children who have died at the
hands of drunk drivers. But none of this makes a police state ac-
ceptable. Freedom doesn't come risk-free. I'm willing to take
be met. On the other hand, if the motorist driving through Burlingame encoun-
tered the roadblocks of a dozen other municipalities along El Camino Real, bur-
den and delay might tip the majority's balance against sobriety checkpoints. Leg-
islative action could provide guidelines aimed at avoiding both of these dangers.
Id. at 672 n.*
113. Id. at 672 (White, J., dissenting).
114. See supra text accompanying note 50.
115. See State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 663 P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1983); State v.
McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Webb v.
Texas, 695 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
116. Ekstrom, 663 P.2d at 995-96 (a roadblock, in theory, is less intrusive than rov-
ing patrols but this roadblock involved too much discretion and intrusion was not mini-
mal); Smith, 674 P.2d at 564 (subjective intrusion imposed on innocent people is simply
too great).
117. 663 P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1983).
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some risks in exchange for my freedom.118
In Ekstrom, the roadblocks were established at the discre-
tion of a local highway patrolman, the operation was not run
under specific guidelines or directions, and the motorists were
taken by surprise because they had no prior notice of the loca-
tion or the checkpoints' purpose.119 Approximately 5,763 vehi-
cles were stopped at various roadblocks, resulting in only four-
teen arrests for driving while intoxicated.120 In finding the
roadblock unconstitutional, the court reasoned that "[i]f there is
an adequate method of enforcing the drunk driving statute,
there is no pressing need for the use of an intrusive roadblock
device."' 21
The concurring opinion intimated that the state should
have argued instead that the true purpose of the roadblock was
to deter drunk driving through apprehension of the roadblock
itself.2 2 "[SItatistics make it obvious that traditional law en-
forcement methods, involving the arrest by roving officers of
only those whom they can stop upon a founded suspicion of
drunk driving, fall short of satisfying society's compelling inter-
est in enforcing compliance with the laws prohibiting drunk
driving."'' 3
118. Id. at 997 (Feldman, J., specially concurring) (quoting Rooney, Roadblocks for
Drunk Drivers Nibble Away at Our Freedoms, CM TRIB., reprinted in THE ARiz. REPUB-
LIC, April 4, 1983, at A7).
119. Id. at 996.
120. Id. at 993.
121. Id. at 996 (no empirical data in the record balanced the reasonableness of the
intrusion upon individual rights against the state's needs).
122. Id. at 997 (Feldman, J., specially concurring).
123. Id. at 999 (Feldman, J., specially concurring) (footnote omitted). "Over the
past 10 years the number of persons killed on our highways in motor vehicle accidents
involving alcohol has averaged 25,000 per year. In 1980, over 650,000 people were injured
in accidents involving alcohol." Id. (quoting Federal Legislation to Combat Drunk Driv-
ing Including National Driver Register: Hearing on S. 671, S. 672, S. 2158 Before the
Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science &
Transportation, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 65 (1982)). "Between 40 and 55% of drivers who
are fatally injured have alcohol concentrations in their blood above the legal limit and
this figure rises to 55 to 65% in single-vehicle crashes." Id. (quoting Alcohol, Drugs &
Driving: Hearing to Examine What Effect Alcohol & Drugs Have on Individuals While
Driving Before the Subcomm. on Alcoholism & Drug Abuse of the Senate Comm. on
Labor & Human Resources, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1982)). "However, 'only 1 of every
2,000 drinking drivers is caught daily, while 70 [people] are killed.'" Id. (quoting Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation, supra at 112).
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In examining the intrusiveness of temporary checkpoints,
the court in State v. Smith' " reasoned that permanent check-
points, like those in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,' were
not as intrusive as temporary checkpoints because individuals
"would not be surprised and fearful of a known roadblock."' 26
b. "Effectiveness" (Second Prong of Brown) was Not
Met
The effectiveness in advancing the public interest was ex-
amined in State v. McLaughlin."7 The court stated that the po-
tential deterrence factor of an unannounced checkpoint in ad-
vancing the public interest against drunk driving was lacking. 28
Also, the checkpoint's effectiveness in advancing the public in-
terest could not be proven because empirical data was unavaila-
ble. "' 9 However, the court announced that if there was "a proper
showing by the state that the roadblock method is more effective
than traditional methods of drunk driving law enforcement [it]
might tip the balance in favor of the reasonableness of the road-
block procedure.' 3 0 Similarly, in holding that a checkpoint was
unconstitutional, the court in Webb v. Texas13 1 stated that there
was no indication that the particular roadblock was more effec-
tive in dealing with drunk driving than the traditional roving
patrols' reasonable suspicion stops because no statistics were
provided. 32 The Webb court also maintained that the state did
not meet its burden of establishing the superiority of the road-
block in light of available less intrusive alternative methods of
deterrence. 33 Lastly, in State v. Muzik, ' 3 the court commented
124. 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
125. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
126. 674 P.2d at 564.
127. 471 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
128. Id. at 1138.
129. Id. "Although three drunk-driving arrests in one hour are not to be taken
lightly, since they represent the prevention of three potential tragedies, we simply have
nothing with which we can compare that number in determining the degree to which this
roadblock procedure advanced the public interest." Id.
130. Id. at 1142.
131. 695 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
132. Id. at 681.
133. Id. at 682.
134. 379 N.W.2d 599 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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that although case law was not uniform in deciding whether the
public interest has been advanced by a checkpoint, it was clear
that most courts required evidence indicating that the check-
point did, in fact, advance the public interest.13 5 In Muzik, the
state failed to demonstrate the superior effectiveness of check-
points over the less intrusive alternative methods which were
based on individualized suspicion.136
C. Federal Highway Grants Awarded to States for Drunk
Driving Prevention Programs
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) has been authorized under the Highway Safety Act to
administer a federal grant program that provides funds to states
which adopt and implement effective programs to reduce alco-
hol-related traffic safety problems.1 37 The program provides for
basic grants if certain criteria are met.13 8 Supplemental grants
are also available to states that employ other measures, such as
roadside sobriety checkpoints.139
The NHTSA also awards incentive grants to states that
adopt and implement certain comprehensive drunk driving pre-
vention programs. 40 The purpose of these programs is to dis-
courage individuals from driving motor vehicles while under the
influence of alcohol. 41 The Code of Federal Regulations defines
a "comprehensive drunk driving prevention program" as a "pro-
gram that reflects the complexity and totality of the State's alco-
135. Id. at 603.
136. Id. at 604.
137. 23 U.S.C. § 402 (1988).
138. 23 U.S.C. § 408 (1988). The criteria for eligibility to receive the basic grant are:
(1) the state must establish an administrative suspension procedure for driver's licenses;
(2) the state must implement a policy for a 0.10% alcohol "per se" violation; (3) the state
must mandate incarceration of repeat offenders, and (4) the state must engage in a pub-
lic-awareness program to inform the public of such enforcement. Id.
139. 23 C.F.R. § 1309.6 (1990). To qualify for a supplemental grant, a state must
have a license suspension system and meet eight of twenty-two requirements, one of
which is the use of a system using roadside sobriety checks. Id.
140. 23 C.F.R. § 1313 (1990).
141. 23 C.F.R. § 1313.2 (1990). "Under the influence of alcohol" means operating a
motor vehicle during the time the individual's blood or breath has an alcohol concentra-
tion of 0.10 or more grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or 0.10 or more grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. The measurement is to be determined by chemical or
other tests. Id. § 1313.3(f).
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hol traffic safety problems, incorporates multiple approaches to
these problems over a sustained period of time and ensures that
public and private entities work in concert to address these
problems."""'
One of the four basic conditions for federal funding is that
the states implement "regularly conducted, peak-hour traffic en-
forcement efforts consisting of measures, such as roadside sobri-
ety checkpoints or special DWI patrols. 14' The grants are lim-
ited to three years and may only be used for the implementation
and enforcement of drunk driving prevention programs.' The
awards are based on a formula apportionment plan. ' "
The grant program indicates that the federal government is
significantly interested in preventing drunk driving. While the
program mentions roadside sobriety checkpoints as a measure
that can be used to reduce alcohol-related safety problems, it
does not specifically require implementation of sobriety check-
points as one of the mandatory criteria for grant eligibility.
D. Summary of Divergent Court Views Leading to Sitz
In 1968, the Supreme Court held in Terry v. Ohio that
under certain circumstances, a "stop and frisk" street confronta-
tion was constitutional."" Next, a number of Border Patrol stops
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion were decided by
the Supreme Court. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, a
roving Border Patrol stop at an area removed from the border
was held by the Supreme Court to violate the fourth amend-
142. Id. § 1313.3(b).
143. Id. The three other basic conditions are:
(2) DWI prosecution, adjudication and sanctioning resources adequate to handle
increased levels of DWI arrests;
(3) other programs directed at forms of prevention other than enforcement and
adjudication activities, such as school, worksite or community education; desig-
nated driver programs; transportation alternatives; responsible alcohol service
programs; server training; or treatment programs; and
(4) a public information program designed to make the public aware of the prob-
lem of drunk driving and of the above efforts in place to address it.
Id.
144. Id. § 1313.4.
145. Id. § 1313.4(b). In addition to the basic or supplemental grant received by a
state, it shall receive reimbursements for the cost of its drunk driving prevention pro-
gram: first year - 75%, second year - 50%, and third year - 25%. Id.
146. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
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ment."'I A roving patrol stop in a border area was held unconsti-
tutional in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce."8 In a subsequent
case, United States v. Ortiz, the Supreme Court decided that a
fixed non-border traffic checkpoint where not all cars were
stopped was unconstitutional, and stated that the greater regu-
larity of the fixed stop does not temper the invasion of privacy,
reduce embarrassment, or eliminate discretion. 49 Finally, in
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Supreme Court held that
a routine stop, where all vehicles were briefly stopped at a non-
border permanent checkpoint, was constitutional. 5 ° Three years
later, the Supreme Court decided in Delaware v. Prouse that
random discretionary vehicle stops without probable cause, rea-
sonable suspicion, standards, guidelines, or procedures, violated
the fourth amendment.15" ' However, dicta in Prouse alluded to
the notion that states could develop spot check methods involv-
ing less intrusion or not involving unconstrained discretion, for
example, "roadblock-type" stops.'5" In the same year as the
Prouse decision, the Supreme Court applied a three-prong bal-
ancing test in Brown v. Texas and held unconstitutional, the ar-
bitrary stop of a pedestrian without suspicion by a cruising of-
ficer who had no authorized procedures to make such a stop.15
Ten years later, the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n and National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, upheld drug and alcohol screening programs to en-
sure the safety of the traveling public.'"
In the interim, sobriety checkpoint programs established by
the states have been challenged in the courts. The state courts
have examined and applied the Supreme Court decisions and
analysis discussed above in holding sobriety checkpoint pro-
grams either constitutional or unconstitutional. In doing so, the
state courts have relied upon the Prouse dicta,'55 the Brown
147. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
148. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
149. 422 U.S. 891 (1975). See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
150. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
151. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
153. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
154. Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). See supra notes
51-65 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
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three-prong balancing test,1 56 or variations of that test, and have
also placed weight on the existence or nonexistence of check-
point program guidelines. 157 The evolution of this confusion
culminates in the Supreme Court case which is the subject of
this Note.
III. Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz
A. Facts
In 1986, the Michigan Department of State Police and its
Director established a sobriety checkpoint pilot program.5 8 The
goals of the program were to: (1) reduce death, injury, and prop-
erty damage resulting from alcohol and drug-related traffic acci-
dents; (2) conduct the checkpoints with a minimal amount of
motorist inconvenience or intrusion; and (3) secure the safety of
the public and the law enforcement officers assigned to the
checkpoint. 159 In addition, the program was designed to: (1) in-
still the apprehension of arrest in the minds of drivers who
would otherwise drive under the influence of alcohol or con-
trolled substances; (2) protect the individuals' constitutionally
guaranteed rights; and (3) remove drunk drivers from the public
highways.1 0
In establishing this program, the Director of the Michigan
State Police appointed a Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Commit-
tee.1 61 This Committee created guidelines setting forth proce-
dures governing checkpoint operations, site selection, and pub-
licity.6 ' The guidelines included safety considerations and
required that the checkpoints be set up at selected sites along
156. See supra notes 88-136 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 83-87, 94-96 and accompanying text.
158. Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Mich. 1988).
159. Brief for Petitioners at 6, Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct.
2481 (1990) (No. 88-1897) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
160. Id.
161. Sitz, 429 N.W.2d at 181.
162. The local media is to be used in publicizing each sobriety checkpoint in order
to enhance the checkpoint's deterrent effect among potential drunk drivers. However,
the public will not be given advance notice of the exact time- and location. Brief for
Petitioners, supra note 159, at 8. The guidelines also included details on briefing, sched-
uling, safety considerations, motorist contact, staffing and assignment of duties. Sitz, 429
N.W.2d at 181.
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state roads. 163 All vehicles would be stopped as they passed
through a checkpoint and the drivers would be briefly examined
for signs of intoxication. 16' If the checkpoint officer detected
signs of intoxication, the motorist would be directed to a loca-
tion outside of the traffic flow where an officer would check the
driver's license and car registration. 5 If warranted, further so-
briety tests would be conducted by the officer.166 If the field
tests and the officer's observations suggested that the driver was
intoxicated, the driver would be arrested. 67 All other drivers
would be permitted to leave the area immediately.6 '
Prior to the Court's decision, the Michigan State Police, in
conjunction with the Saginaw County Sheriff's Department, con-
ducted Michigan's first sobriety checkpoint.6 9 The checkpoint
remained in operation for one hour and fifteen minutes. 7 ' Dur-
ing that time, 126 vehicles passed through the checkpoint.'
The average delay for each vehicle was approximately twenty-
five seconds.17 Two drivers were detained for field sobriety test-
ing, and one of the two was arrested for driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol.173 A third individual who drove through without
stopping was pulled over by an officer in an observation vehicle
and was also arrested for driving while intoxicated.17 4
On May 16, 1986, the day before the checkpoint operation
began, plaintiffs filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment
163. Sitz, 429 N.W.2d at 181. The Michigan State Police Sobriety Checkpoint
Guidelines required several safety measures. A sufficient number of uniformed police of-
ficers would man each checkpoint site. Appropriate safety reflector equipment would be
utilized. This could include flares and/or reflectors to illuminate each site and aid in
directing traffic. Conspicuously displayed warning signs, flares, cones, and/or emergency
lighting equipment would be used to provide advance warning of the upcoming check-
point stop. Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 152a-53a, Michigan Dep't of State Po-
lice v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990) (No. 88-1897).
164. Sitz, 429 N.W.2d at 181.
165. Id.
166. Id. (such testing could include a breathalyzer test).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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and injunctive relief in the Wayne County Circuit Court.17 5
Plaintiffs were licensed drivers of the State of Michigan who
regularly traveled by automobile throughout the state.1 76 Pend-
ing the outcome of the case, the defendants agreed to delay im-
plementation of the sobriety checkpoint program.177
B. Procedural History
1. The Trial Court Opinion
In an unpublished opinion dated June 14, 1986, the trial
court found that, although there was statutory authority for the
sobriety checkpoint operation, the plan violated the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution '1 8 and Article 1, §
11 of the Michigan Constitution.1 7 9 The trial court applied the
Brown three-prong balancing test. 8 ' In doing so, it weighed the
gravity of the state's interest in preventing accidents caused by
drunk drivers, the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in
achieving the state's goal, and the degree of intrusiveness on an
individual's liberty resulting from the sobriety checkpoint
stops."'
In its analysis, the trial court indicated that the state had a
grave and legitimate interest in curbing drunk driving because
evidence indicated that alcohol was a contributing factor in
about twenty-five to fifty percent of motor vehicle fatalities.' 2
The court concluded, however, that the sobriety checkpoint pro-
175. Id. (challenging the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoint programs).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See supra note 6.
179. Sitz, 429 N.W.2d at 181-82. The Michigan statute provides in pertinent part:
The director of the department of state police shall cause inspection to be made of
motor vehicles operating on the public highways to detect defective equipment or
other violations of law governing the use of public highways by motor vehicles,
operators, and chauffeurs. For that purpose the director may establish temporary
vehicle check lanes at appropriate locations throughout the state for checking for
inadequacies and violations. A county, city, village, or township police department
also may operate a temporary check lane within its limits with the express author-
ization of the director of the department of state police and under the direct su-
pervision of a designated representative of the director.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.715(2) (1979).
180. See supra text accompanying note 50.
181. Sitz, 429 N.W.2d at 182.
182. Id. at 183.
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gram did not significantly further that interest because: 1) the
number of arrests was too insignificant to provide more than
minimal deterrence; and 2) the deterrent effect of massive pub-
licity was extremely short term. 183
In measuring the objective intrusion, the trial court found
the duration of the seizure and intensity of the investigation to
be minimal.184 The court found, however, that the subjective in-
trusion on individual liberty interests was substantial 85 because
the checkpoints had the potential to cause fear and surprise to
motorists.18 6
2. The Michigan Court of Appeals Opinion
The Michigan appellate court affirmed the trial court's find-
ings that "the State has a 'grave and legitimate' interest in curb-
ing drunken driving; that sobriety checkpoint programs are gen-
erally ineffective and, therefore, do not significantly further that
interest; and that [while the checkpoints' objective intrusion is
slight], their 'subjective intrusion' on individual liberties is
substantial. 1 8 7
The Michigan appellate court found it unnecessary to con-
sider the validity of the checkpoint pursuant to the Michigan
Constitution because the pertinent provision offers at least the
same protection as provided by the fourth amendment."8 8 There-
fore, the holding under the Michigan Constitution would parallel
the holding under the fourth amendment. 18 9
183. Id. Dr. Lawrence Ross, plaintiffs' expert witness, testified that "one percent or
fewer of the drivers passing through sobriety checkpoints are arrested for drunk driving.
... [Wihile studies indicated a short-term deterrent effect resulting from various cam-
paigns against drunk driving, the statistics eventually returned to their normal level." Id.
Dr. Ross explained that "while the publicity which accompanies the initiation of
such programs leads the public to believe that the chances of being caught are high, once
people learn that the chances of apprehension are not that high, people return to their
normal behavior." Id.
184. Id. at 184. The delay for each vehicle was approximately twenty-five seconds.
Id. at 181. See supra text accompanying note 172.
185. Sitz, 429 N.W.2d at 184.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 185.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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C. The Supreme Court Opinions
1. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court
and held that a state's use of highway sobriety checkpoints did
not violate the provisions of the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution."'0 Like the lower courts, the Sitz
Court addressed only the initial stop of the vehicle and the re-
lated preliminary questioning of the motorist and observations
by checkpoint officers."" The Court noted that detention of a
motorist for more extensive field sobriety testing could require
satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard.' 92
The Sitz Court found that United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte93 and Brown v. Texas' were the relevant authorities in
determining the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints.'9 The
majority rejected respondents' reasoning that it should follow
the analysis in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab,19 which required a showing of a "special need" before dis-
pensing with the requirements of probable cause or reasonable
suspicion." 7 The Court explained that Von Raab "was in no way
designed to repudiate our prior cases dealing with police stops of
motorists on public highways. 198
The Court stated that all the parties involved correctly
agreed that a fourth amendment "seizure" occurs when a vehicle
is stopped at a checkpoint.' 9 9 Therefore, the only issue to be de-
cided was whether such seizures are "reasonable" under the
190. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2488 (1990).
191. Id. at 2485.
192. Id.
193. 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (holding that the government interest outweighed minimal
intrusion caused by permanent checkpoints near border). See supra notes 32-37 and ac-
companying text.
194. 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (establishing a three-prong balancing test: (1) gravity of
public interest, (2) effectiveness in advancing public interest, (3) intrusion on individual
liberty). See supra text accompanying note 50.
195. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485.
196. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
197. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text; see also
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); see supra notes 51-57
and accompanying text.
198. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485.
199. Id.
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fourth amendment.200
The Court first dismissed the issue of whether the state had
a legitimate interest in combating drunk driving by stating that
statistical evidence concerning alcohol-related death and mutila-
tion on the nation's roads clearly substantiates this interest.2 1
"No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken
driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it. '202
Next, the Court discussed the measure of the objective in-
trusion on motorists who were stopped briefly at sobriety check-
points and concluded that this intrusion was slight.20 The Court
compared this intrusion to the brief highway checkpoint stops
for the detection of illegal aliens in Martinez-Fuerte.0 " "We see
virtually no difference between the levels of intrusion on law-
abiding motorists from the brief stops necessary to the effectua-
tion of these two types of checkpoints, which to the average mo-
torist would seem identical save for the nature of the questions
the checkpoint officers might ask. ' 205 Here, the objective intru-
sion was accurately measured - by the duration of the seizure
and the intensity of the investigation - as being minimal.206
The Court then discussed the controversy of the subjective
intrusion on motorists, and concluded that the Michigan courts
misread prior Supreme Court cases concerning the degree of
subjective intrusion and the. potential for generating fear and
surprise.2 7 The Court stated that "[t]he 'fear and surprise' to be
considered are not the natural fear of one who has been drinking
over the prospect of being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint but,
rather, the fear and surprise engendered in law abiding motor-
ists by the nature of the stop. '20 8 The Court found that check-
point stops, where motorists can see other vehicles being
stopped as well as visible signs of officers' authority, are appreci-
ably less intrusive than roving-patrol stops.0 9
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2485-86.
202. Id. at 2485.
203. Id. at 2486.
204. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
205. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2486.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2486-87. For a comparison of checkpoint stops to roving patrol stops, see
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The Sitz Court stated that the Michigan appellate court
misinterpreted the Brown test.21 0 The Court discussed the de-
gree to which the seizure advanced the public interest, the sec-
ond prong (Effectiveness" prong) of the Brown balancing test.21
The Court explained that it was incorrect for the appellate court
to conclude that because the checkpoints produced only a short-
term deterrent effect, this prong was not met, and that the court
was incorrect to urge an examination for other alternatives.2 2
The Court explained that Brown was not meant to shift the
power and responsibility of determining which law enforcement
techniques were to be used to manage a serious danger from po-
litically accountable officials to the courts.1 8 "[F]or purposes of
Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable
alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a
unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public
resources, including a finite number of police officers."21
Finally, the Court explained its conclusion that the sobriety
checkpoints are effective by discussing the Brown test, in light of
the Martinez-Fuerte15 and Prouse216 decisions. 217 First, regard-
ing Prouse, the Supreme Court disapproved the random stops to
apprehend unlicensed drivers and unsafe vehicles because em-
pirical evidence did not demonstrate that such stops would be
an effective means of promoting roadway safety.18 Second, the
Court observed in Martinez-Fuerte that illegal aliens were dis-
covered in 0.12% of the vehicles passing through the checkpoint
and the ratio of illegal aliens to the vehicles stopped was approx-
imately 0.5%.219 The Court noted that these statistics demon-
strated the effectiveness of the Martinez-Fuerte checkpoint. 2 0
In Sitz, drunk driving arrests resulting from the checkpoint con-
supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
210. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2487.
211. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 50.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 38-45.
217. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2487-88.
218. Id. at 2487.
219. Id. at 2488.
220. Id.
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stituted approximately 1.5% of the drivers passing through the
checkpoint.2 21 Statistics of other states showed that one percent
of the drivers passing through sobriety checkpoints were ar-
rested for drunk driving. 22 The Court concluded that the effec-
tiveness was not less in Sitz than in Martinez-Fuerte and, there-
fore, it could not justify a different conclusion in Sitz. 223
Thus, the Court reversed the state courts' decisions and
held that the sobriety checkpoint program was consistent with
the fourth amendment. The Court declared that "the balance of
the State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to
which this system can reasonably be said to advance that inter-
est, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who
are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the state program. "224
2. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Blackmun concurred only in the judgment in order
to reiterate his prior comments that the dangers imposed upon
society by drunk drivers are serious and the "slaughter on the
highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our
wars." 25 Justice Blackmun stated, "I am pleased, of course, that
the Court is now stressing this tragic aspect of American life. '12
3.- The Dissenting Opinions
a. Justice Brennan's Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Brennan stated that "the Court mis-
applies [the balancing test] by undervaluing the nature of the
intrusion and exaggerating the law enforcement need to use the
roadblocks to prevent drunken driving. 2 27 He agreed that the
initial checkpoint stop is sufficiently less intrusive than an arrest
such that the reasonableness of the seizure may be judged by the
balancing test.228 He remarked, however, that the majority opin-
221. Id. at 2487.
222. Id. at 2487-88.
223. Id. at 2488.
224. Id.*
225. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
226. Id.
227. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 2489.
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ion did not specifically state that the reason for employing the
balancing test was the minimally intrusive nature of the
seizure.229 Justice Brennan explained that although the majority
asserted that reasonable suspicion is not necessary when the in-
trusion is slight, no support was offered that the minimum in-
trusion causes the balance to be weighed in favor of the state
program.23 In asserting that some level of individualized suspi-
cion is necessary, he stated:
[W]e have generally required the Government to prove that it
had reasonable suspicion for a minimally intrusive seizure to be
considered reasonable .... By holding that no level of suspicion is
necessary before the police may stop a car for the purpose of
preventing drunken driving, the Court potentially subjects the
general public to arbitrary or harassing conduct by the police."' 1
In addition, Justice Brennan was troubled by the Court's
reliance on United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,s. the only case
where suspicionless seizures were upheld.23 He agreed with Jus-
tice Stevens, who also dissented, that the policy of the Michigan
sobriety checkpoint program was sufficiently different from the
Martinez-Fuerte program not to warrant reliance on its hold-
ing.234 Justice Brennan further argued, however, that even if the
policies were similar, that would not justify abandoning the re-
quirement of individualized suspicion in this case.23 Although in
Martinez-Fuerte, suspicionless stops were justified because
holding otherwise would make it impractical to identify illegal
aliens traveling in vehicles, the same difficulty did not exist in
detecting drunk drivers.23 "Without proof that the police can-
not develop individualized suspicion that a person is driving
while impaired by alcohol, I believe the constitutional balance
229. Id. Justice Brennan stated that, generally, probable cause is required for a
seizure to be considered reasonable. This requirement is replaced by a balancing test
only when the seizure is substantially less intrusive than a typical arrest. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see supra notes 6-14, 19-23 and
accompanying text; see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (supra
notes 19-23 and accompanying text).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
233. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2489 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
234. Id.; see infra notes 251-58 and accompanying text.
235. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2489 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
236. Id.
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must be struck in favor of protecting the public against even the
'minimally intrusive' seizures involved in this case. 2 37 Moreover,
Justice Brennan agreed with the Court's rationale in Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States238 that loyalty to constitutional safe-
guards should not be displaced by the tensions of law
enforcement.239
b. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Like Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens contended that the
Court misapplied the Brown balancing test.24 "The Court over-
values the law enforcement interest in using sobriety check-
points, undervalues the citizen's interest in freedom from ran-
dom, unannounced investigatory seizures, and mistakenly as-
sumes that there is 'virtually no difference' between a routine
stop at a permanent, fixed checkpoint and a surprise stop at a
sobriety checkpoint. 24' 1
Justice Stevens asserted that the individual's interest in
freedom from suspicionless, unannounced investigatory seizures
was given no weight by the Court.2 2 "These seizures play upon
the detained individual's reasonable expectations of privacy, in-
jecting a suspicionless search into a context where none would
normally occur. The imposition that seems diaphanous today
may be intolerable tomorrow. ' 243 He found that the majority's
decision was motivated by "symbolic state action - an insuffi-
cient justification for an otherwise unreasonable program of ran-
dom seizures. '244 He explained that the Court, instead of being
attracted to the prospect of punishing innumerable intoxicated
motorists, should be more concerned with maintaining constitu-
tional protections.46
In addition, Justice Stevens claimed that the Court's posi-
tion that sobriety checkpoint seizures advance the public inter-
237. Id. at 2490.
238. 413 U.S. 266 (1973); see supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
239. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2490 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 2492 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 2497.
243. Id. at 2498.
244. Id. at 2499.
245. Id.
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est was indefensible.2'6 He stated that "there is absolutely no
evidence that this [one percent arrest] figure represents an in-
crease over the number of arrests that would have been made by
using the same law enforcement resources in conventional pa-
trols."2 7 He saw no proof that the seizures produced any net
advance to the public interest in arresting drunk drivers.2 ' Jus-
tice Stevens offered statistics" 9 to show that the benefits of the
sobriety checkpoint program in combating drunk driving can be
achieved by more conventional means, and that the relationship
between sobriety checkpoints and the actual reduction in high-
way fatalities is not substantial.2 5
246. Id. at 2495.
247. Id. (footnote omitted).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2491 nn.2-4.
250. Id. at 2491. For example, Maryland had operated 125 checkpoints over a period
of several years and out of 41,000 motoristspassing through those checkpoints, only 143
motorists (0.3%) were arrested for driving while intoxicated. Id. The statistics for other
states are somewhat comparable to Maryland. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice
Ct., 663 P.2d 992, 993 (Ariz. 1983) (5,763 cars stopped, 14 persons, 0.2%, arrested for
drunk driving); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (Cal. 1987) (233 vehicles
screened, no arrests for drunk driving); State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1137 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1984) (115 cars stopped, three, 3%, arrests for drunk driving); State v. Deskins,
673 P.2d 1174, 1187 (Kan. 1983) (Prager, J., dissenting) (2,000 to 3,000 vehicles stopped,
15, 0.6%, arrests made, 140 police man hours consumed); Commonwealth v. Trumble,
483 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Mass. 1985) (503 cars stopped, eight, 1.6%, arrests, 13 participat-
ing officers); State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977, 979 (N.H. 1985) (1,680 vehicles stopped, 18,
1.1%, arrests for driving while intoxicated). Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.
Ct. 2481, 2491 n.3 (1990), (Stevens, J., dissenting).
By comparison, Michigan State Police made 71,000 arrests for drunk driving, with-
out checkpoints, in 1984 alone. Id. at 2491. Note that this statistic was taken out of
context from the Wayne County Circuit Court opinion, Sitz v. Michigan Dep't of State
Police, No. 86-63-063-C2 (D. Mich. June 24, 1986), in support of the state's contention
that it had no available practical means to advance its interest in curbing drunk driving
other than by implementing sobriety checkpoints. The state offered the following
statistics:
While from 1958 to 1984, non alcohol related accidents had fallen from 2.8 per
100,000,000 miles of road traveled to 1.9; alcohol related accidents remained at
approximately 1.1 per 100,000,000 miles of road traveled .... [Diuring this time
period, however, the amount of drunk driving arrests had risen from approxi-
mately 17,000 statewide in 1968, to over 71,000 in 1984 .... [O]n the basis of this
data... conventional methods of curbing drunk driving have not had a significant
impact on the problem.
Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Petitioner at 96a-97a, Michigan Dep't of
State Police v. Sitz, 493 U.S. 806 (1989) (No. 88-1897), microformed on U.S. Supreme
Court Records and Briefs (Congressional Info. Serv.). For a detailed analysis of the Ma-
ryland study, see James Jacobs and Nadine Strossen, Mass Investigations Without Indi-
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Finally, Justice Stevens did not believe that this case was
similar to Martinez-Fuerte251 for the following reasons: (1) the
element of surprise present in the temporary sobriety check-
point stops was not present in the permanent interior border
stops upheld in Martinez-Fuerte;25 2 (2) the police had broad dis-
cretion in determining the timing and placement of the sobriety
checkpoints, but there was no such discretion when the check-
point is permanent; 53 (3) a driver's license check or an immigra-
tion identification check is more easily standardized than a
check for evidence of intoxication;2 4 (4) an officer at a sobriety
checkpoint has practically unlimited discretion to detain the
driver on the slightest suspicion;255 and (5) permanent check-
point stops in Martinez-Fuerte occurred during the daytime and
evening hours while sobriety checkpoint stops generally oper-
vidualized Suspicion: A Constitutional and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving Road-
blocks, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 595, 640 n.200 (1985).
Also, the results of a Maryland study comparing traffic statistics from both a check-
point county and a control county indicated that alcohol-related accidents in the check-
point county decreased by ten percent and fatal accidents doubled, whereas the control
county experienced an eleven percent decrease in alcohol-related accidents and fatal ac-
cidents dropped from sixteen to three. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2491-92. Note that Justice
Stevens did not indicate the time-frame tested for those statistics, which would be neces-
sary for a clear understanding of the study. The time periods utilized in the analysis of
the test were pointed out in the Wayne County Circuit Court opinion:
When compared with the preceding three month period, the data indicates both
counties experienced rates of decline in alcohol related accidents. Additionally,
both counties experienced declines in the rate of fatalities when compared to the
data concerning the three month period immediately preceding the test period...
. [Diuring this time period Maryland was implementing several other programs.
The similarity in the decreasing rate of alcohol related injuries which occurred in
both counties, checklane and non-checklane, is consistent, if anything, with an
overall state wide trend.
Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Petitioner at 89a-90a, Michigan Dep't of
State Police v. Sitz, 493 U.S. 806 (1989) (No. 88-1897).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
252. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2492 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 2493.
255. Id. Justice Stevens explained that there is a marked difference between the
kind of discretion an officer exercises in an immigration check and in a check for intoxi-
cation. For example, an identification check merely requires the production of immigra-
tion papers, while a search for evidence of intoxication could consist of an examination of
a motorist's physical characteristics such as a ruddy complexion, bloodshot eyes, un-
kempt clothing, or a speech impediment. Id.
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ated at night - which was more offensive than in daylight. 2"6
In addition, the subjective fears generated at a checkpoint stop
are not solely those of the guilty because a law-abiding individ-
ual is not necessarily irreproachable.2 57 "[T]hose who have
found - by reason of prejudice or misfortune - that en-
counters with the police may become adversarial or unpleasant
without good cause will have grounds for worrying at any stop
designed to elicit signs of suspicious behavior. '2 5 8
IV. Analysis
A. A Comparative Analysis of the Sitz Majority and Dissent-
ing Opinions
1. The Flaws in the Dissenting Opinions
a. Correct Application of "Intrusiveness" Prong by
Majority
The three dissenting Justices argued that the Brown balanc-
ing test 5 9 was misapplied because the majority did not give
enough weight to the element of intrusiveness on the individ-
ual 2 60 The dissenting opinions are flawed because the majority
did properly consider the element of intrusion on individual lib-
erty by splitting its analysis into objective and subjective intru-
sion and then supporting both elements.
The Court stated that after measuring the duration of the
seizure and the intensity of the investigation, the objective in-
trusion was minimal.21 The facts of the case indicate that the
average delay for the stop was approximately twenty-five
seconds per vehicle,262 the intensity of the investigation con-
sisted of only a brief observation of the driver,263 and no sobriety
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. For a discussion of the Brown balancing test see supra text accompanying note
50.
260. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2488, (1990) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); id. at 2492 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes
227-31 and 241-44.
261. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2486; see supra text accompanying note 205.
262. See supra text accompanying note 172.
263. See supra text accompanying note 164.
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tests were administered unless the checkpoint officer detected
signs of intoxication.264
All of the following checkpoint requirements, by alleviating
fear and surprise and providing for the safety of the public,
serve to diminish the subjective intrusion on the individual. The
subjective intrusion of fear and surprise, as considered by the
Court, is that of a sober driver and not that of a drunk driver
who is afraid his drunkenness will be detected at a check-
point.265 In addition, because the checkpoints are required to be
set up along state roads,266 motorists can see other vehicles being
stopped and can see signs of police officers' authority267 such as
uniformed officers, advance illuminated warning signs, flashing
lights, and safety cones.2 68 Finally, surprise is also reduced be-
cause the checkpoint guidelines require that the public be noti-
fied in advance via local media that the checkpoint will be in
operation.2 69
b. Statistical Evidence Insufficient to Refute the Neces-
sity for Sobriety Checkpoints
Justice Stevens stated that there is no evidence that sobri-
ety checkpoints are superior to conventional methods270 and pro-
duced statistics to support his position.2 7' These statistics, how-
ever, are flawed for a number of reasons. First, the deterrent
effect was not considered because it is not capable of measure-
ment.2712 Furthermore, the dissent disregards the purpose of the
checkpoints as being not only to arrest drunk drivers but also to
deter drivers from drinking and driving in the first place.27 3
Even if the statistics relied upon by Justice Stevens were
264. See supra text accompanying notes 165-66.
265. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2486; see supra text accompanying note 208.
266. See supra text accompanying note 163.
267. See supra text accompanying note 209.
268. For a discussion on sobriety checkpoint safety requirements see supra note 163.
269. See supra note 162.
270. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2495-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 244-47.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 249-50.
272. See People v. Scott, 473 N.E.2d 1 (1984) (substantial reductions in deaths and
injuries caused by drunken driving may stem from legislative reforms instead of sobriety
checkpoints); see supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 104.
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valid, when evaluated in terms of percentages and hourly arrests
they actually support the majority view. The 71,000 non-check-
point arrests in 198474 is equal to eight arrests per hour for the
entire state of Michigan. In Sitz, the one checkpoint in one hour
resulted in approximately two arrests.2 75 When evaluating the
number of drivers arrested at checkpoints in various states in
terms of percentages, the arrest rates vary from 0.2 percent to 7
percent.276 This range far exceeds the 0.5 percent which was held
to be effective for detecting aliens hiding in vehicles in the Mar-
tinez-Fuerte decision. 7
Finally, for the statistics to be meaningful, the number of
police engaged in the random stops must be compared with the
number of police employed at the checkpoints. Sobriety check-
points provide police with the opportunity to observe a larger
portion of the motoring public than it can observe through ordi-
nary roving patrol procedures.7 8
Notwithstanding the flawed statistics, evidence of superior-
ity of one method over another is not necessary, even though the
number of fatalities and injuries caused by drunk drivers indi-
cates that traditional methods have obviously failed and that a
different approach is needed. 79 In the interest of public safety,
the state has the right to use all available resources without hav-
ing to prove the exact effect of each measure taken. 80 Further,
the majority made it clear that it is not for the Court to decide
which law enforcement techniques to use in eombating a serious
danger; the choice is the responsibility of the government offi-
cials.28' Because the government officials are elected by the citi-
zens, these officials should decide whether sobriety checkpoint
programs further their objective of combating drunk driving.282
274. See supra text accompanying note 250.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 170-74.
276. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2491; see supra note 250.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 219-23.
278. People v. Bartley, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (Ill. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068
(1986); see supra note 107.
279. See supra note 81.
280. People v. Scott, 473 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1984); see supra text accompanying note 105.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 212-14.
282. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (White, J., dissent-
ing); see supra text accompanying note 112.
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c. Permanent Non-Border Checkpoints Similar to So-
briety Checkpoints in Terms of Purpose and
Operation
The dissenting Justices reasoned that the permanent non-
border checkpoint stops in Martinez-Fuerte2s3 cannot be com-
pared to temporary sobriety checkpoints because they impact
motorists differently. The dissenters further reasoned that when
police apply the individualized suspicion standard, it is more
difficult to detect illegal aliens in vehicles than it is to detect
drunk drivers.2 84 They conclude, therefore, that individualized
suspicion should be the standard for stopping drunk drivers,
even if "stopping every car might make it easier to prevent
drunk driving.' '2s Permanent and temporary checkpoints, how-
ever, are analogous, and the reasoning of the dissenting opinions,
therefore, is flawed.
First, when an individual encounters a sobriety checkpoint
in a state with a sobriety checkpoint program policy, the stop
should not be met with any more surprise than the Martinez-
Fuerte permanent interior border checkpoint.2 6 Both check-
points have advance warning signs, flashing lights, safety cones,
and uniformed officers evidencing the official authority of the
stop.8 7 Although a cautious and well-traveled individual may
have incentive to be cognizant of the location of a permanent
non-border checkpoint, especially if he is transporting illegal
aliens, the average individual who is not concerned with the
smuggling of illegal aliens would probably have the same level of
surprise when reaching a permanent non-border checkpoint as a
motorist approaching a temporary sobriety checkpoint. The mo-
torist who has nothing to hide should have little apprehension at
either stop. 28
Second, the discretionary factor is identical in both perma-
283. SEE supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
284. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2489-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 2490-97 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); see supra notes 223-56 and accompanying text.
285. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2490 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
286. See supra text accompanying note 33.
287. See supra notes 33 and 163.
288. State v. Coccomo, 427 A.2d 131, 134 n.7 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (mo-
torist stopped at sobriety checkpoint stop did not indicate that the procedures utilized
had generated any fright, anxiety, or concern); see supra note 97.
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nent and temporary checkpoint situations. The experience of the
officer conducting the checkpoint permits him to make a profes-
sional evaluation regarding the necessity to expand his inquiry
beyond brief questioning and visual inspection. 289 Additionally,
the Michigan State Police, as the Border Patrol in Martinez-
Fuerte, used discretion in making the official decisions regarding
the timing and placement of the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz. 290
However, the discretionary considerations in temporary check-
points are mitigated by guidelines which govern such details like
operational procedures, site selection, publicity, and the utiliza-
tion in Sitz, of a computerized program to make site
selections.291
Finally, the problem of effective detection of illegal aliens
concealed in vehicles and of alcohol-impaired drivers is indistin-
guishable. Because the drunk driver does not always appear to
be driving erratically,9 2 it is the circumstances surrounding the
observation that create factors to test the extent of the impair-
ment of the driver's ability to react. For example, traffic moving
without incident could not test a driver's reaction time to avoid
a collision, and the driver would effectively evade the roving pa-
trolman's detection. The issue is: at what point is it most effec-
tive to stop the drunk driver? If the drunk driver is to be
stopped before any harm is caused, he should be stopped before
he is detected for driving erratically. At that point, he may be as
difficult to spot as the illegal alien concealed in a vehicle. Statis-
tics indicate that arrests of only those drunk drivers that could
be stopped by roving patrols upon a founded suspicion do not
effectively enforce the prohibition against drunk driving.29 Con-
sequently, sobriety checkpoints can detect drunk drivers before
they drive in an erratic manner. 9 "
289. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562 (selective referral of motorists to secondary
inspection area was constitutional); see supra text accompanying notes 164-68.
290. Brief for Petitioners at 7, Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct.
2481 (1990) (No. 88-1897).
291. Id. at 7-8.
292. People v. Bartley, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (Ill. 1985) cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068
(1986) (roadblocks detect drunk drivers before they drive erratically); see supra text ac-
companying note 107.
293. State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 663 P.2d 992, 999 (Ariz. 1983) (Feldman,
J., concurring); see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
294. People v. Bartley, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (Ill. 1985) cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068
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2. Majority Wins, Flaws Destroy Dissent - A Summary
of Compelling Arguments
The issue is whether the "seizure" that initially occurs when
a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint is "reasonable" under the
fourth amendment. 29 5 The Brown three-prong test was utilized
in determining this reasonableness.296 The dissent stated that
the Brown balancing test was misapplied because the intrusive-
ness on the individual was not given proper weight.29 However,
the majority did give proper weight to the intrusiveness element.
In analyzing the "Individual Liberty" prong of Brown, the ma-
jority split its analysis into two tracks." 8 Consequently, the ma-
jority determined that the "objective" intrusion, measured by
the duration of the seizure and the intensity of the investigation,
was minimal, and it supported its determination with facts evi-
dencing.the brevity of the procedure.299 Next, the majority clari-
fied that the measurement of the "subjective" intrusion of fear
and surprise at a checkpoint stop was that of a sober, law abid-
ing motorist, and that the intrusion was minimal, as compared
to a drunk driver fearful of being detected.300 In addition, the
majority correctly reasoned that any surprise element was miti-
gated by the visible, well-lighted approach to the checkpoint
area, and advance media publicity. 01
Next, the dissent attacked the "effectiveness" of sobriety
checkpoint stops by providing statistics demonstrating the effec-
tiveness of conventional methods.302 However, the majority con-
cluded that the effectiveness of the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz
was not less than in Martinez-Fuerte which the Court deter-
mined was effective. 303
Finally, the dissenters unsuccessfully argued that the Marti-
nez-Fuerte decision upholding suspicionless permanent non-bor-
(1986); see supra text accompanying note 107.
295. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 227-37 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
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der checkpoint stops should not be applied to sobriety check-
point stops, even if stopping every car might make it easier to
prevent drunk driving, because the police have the ability to de-
velop individualized suspicion that a person is driving while im-
paired by alcohol.3 0' The majority articulated that determining
which law enforcement techniques to utilize belong to politically
accountable officials who have an understanding of the available
resources and the danger the techniques are designed to
prevent."'0
B. Clear-cut Checkpoint Guidelines - A Suggested Model
Although the Supreme Court was correct in its decision up-
holding the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints in Michi-
gan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 30 the Court did not com-
pletely resolve the sobriety checkpoint program issues because
the opinion did not provide clear-cut and uniform checkpoint
guidelines. Many state courts have upheld sobriety checkpoint
programs where discretion was limited by checkpoint guide-
lines.3 " A uniform set of guidelines would perhaps eliminate the
uncertainty of the constitutionality of a state's program by re-
moving the discretionary element that was present in Delaware
v. Prouse.308
304. See supra notes 232-37, 285 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
306. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
307. See State v. Golden, 318 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Commonwealth v.
Trumble, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (Mass. 1985); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 337 S.E.2d 273 (Va.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986); see supra note 77 and accompanying text
(checkpoint upheld when the state's discretion is limited by guidelines). See State v.
Jones, 483 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1986); State v. Crom, 383 N.W.2d 461 (Neb. 1986); State v.
Kirk, 493 A.2d 1271 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); see supra text accompanying notes
85-87; (checkpoints would have been constitutional if precise guidelines had been fol-
lowed). See State v. Superior Court, 691 P.2d 1073 (Ariz. 1984); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 221
Cal. Rptr. 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 743 P.2d 1299 (Cal. 1987); People v. Bartley,
486 N.E.2d 880 (Ill. 1985) cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986); Little v. State, 479 A.2d 903
(Md. 1984); State v. Coccomo, 427 A.2d 131 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980); People v.
Scott, 473 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1984); see supra notes 94 and 96 (court determined that neu-
tral, non-discretionary guidelines were utilized). See supra text accompanying note 119
(checkpoint was unconstitutional where the operation was not run under specific guide-
lines or directions).
308. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text (random discretionary stop with-
out probable cause, reasonable suspicion, standards, guidelines, or procedures was
unconstitutional).
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The following is a model set of guidelines: 09
1. Site Selection
a. Safety of citizens and law enforcement personnel shall be
considered.
b. There shall be a safe area for stopping a driver.
c. There shall be sufficient sight distance warning for a
driver to safely come to a stop.
d. There shall be a minimum amount of inconvenience for
the driver to come to a safe stop.
e. There shall be sufficient adjoining space to pull a vehicle
off to the side if further inquiry is needed.
2. Safety Measures
a. The site shall have a sufficient number of uniformed of-
ficers on duty, including a commissioned officer of at least lieu-
tenant rank.
b. An officer shall be stationed in advance of the checkpoint
to direct traffic and warn other officers of dangerous situations.
c. Reflectorized safety equipment shall be utilized.
(1) There shall be flares and reflectors for illuminating the
site and for indicating traffic direction.
(2) There shall be equipment to provide advance and con-
spicuous notice of the stop.
i. Warning signs.
ii. Flares.
iii. Safety cones.
iv. Emergency lighting equipment.
v. Flashlights to direct traffic movement.
vi. Presence of police vehicles.
3. Procedures for motorist contact shall be clear and narrowly
defined.
a. All vehicles passing through the checkpoint shall be
stopped for a brief but reasonable duration.
b. The police officer shall identify himself.
c. The police officer shall explain the purpose of the stop to
309. Guidelines were adopted by the author and revised. The following sources were
used: Ingersoll v. Palmer, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659, 667-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd 743 P.2d
1299 (Cal. 1987), see supra note 96 and accompanying text; Appendix to Petition for
Certiorari at 152a-56a, Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990) (No.
88-1897), see supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
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the motorist.
d. The police officer shall distribute literature regarding the
stop to the motorist.
e. If there are no signs of intoxication, the motorist shall be
permitted to pass through the checkpoint. (Indications of intoxi-
cation may include: odor of alcoholic beverages, slurred speech,
lack of physical coordination, atypical eye movements or appear-
ance, and disorientation.)
f. If there are signs of intoxication, the driver shall be di-
rected to an out-of-traffic location for additional inquiries. (Ad-
ditional inquiries may include: request for driver's license and
vehicle documents, field sobriety tests, and breath tests.)
g. If sufficient evidence of intoxication is present, the driver
shall be arrested; otherwise, the driver shall be released.
4. Publicity
a. The existence of sobriety checkpoint programs shall be
publicized regularly.
b. The exact location and time of the checkpoint operation
shall not be announced.
C. Tie Mandatory Checkpoint Programs to Federal Highway
Grants
The effectiveness of sobriety checkpoint programs is limited
because the programs are not mandatory. Airport metal detector
searches, 1M drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees,31'
and drug testing of United States Customs Service employees 312
have congressional approval. Sobriety checkpoint programs
should have similar legislative authorization as part of a general
regulatory scheme to further the health, safety, and welfare of
the general public. The prevention of the pirating or explosion
of a large airplane eliminates the risk to hundreds of human
lives and millions of dollars of property. 13 Drug and alcohol
310. For a discussion on airport security, see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 59.
313. See supra text accompanying note.65. See Ingersoll v. Palmer, 221 Cal. Rptr.
659 (1985), aff'd, 743 P.2d 1299 (1987) (suggested that airport search and screening pro-
cedures were similar to sobriety checkpoints as tools for detection and deterrence and
intimated that there should be legislation for sobriety checkpoint programs). See supra
text accompanying notes 108-11.
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testing of railroad employees ensures the safety of the traveling
public and the safety of the railroad employees by preventing
railroad accidents.31 4 Mandating drug testing of customs em-
ployees in positions requiring the use of firearms, prevents the
risk to individuals of the use of deadly force by drug-impaired
persons. '15 Similarly, the risk of death on the nation's roadways
as part of the annual statistic of 25,000 people dying in alcohol-
related traffic accidents1 ' should also be reduced by mandatory
sobriety checkpoint programs.
In addition to health, safety, and welfare being served by
sobriety checkpoint legislation, burdens and delays caused by
successive checkpoint operations at points along an interstate
highway could be minimized." '1 The programs could be set up to
prevent duplication of efforts and to promote cooperation be-
tween states.
Also, sobriety checkpoint stops would become expected and
accepted as part of everyday life. This expectation would elimi-
nate the surprise element presently existing under the current
system; motorists would be given advance warnings of approach-
ing sobriety checkpoint stops and reminders by mass publicity
campaigns.
Because the prevention of drunk driving is an urgent prob-
lem, the most efficient method of implementing federal sobriety
checkpoint regulations would be to tie the sobriety checkpoint
programs directly to federal highway grants. The federal high-
way grant programs currently provide funds to states which
adopt and implement programs to effectively reduce alcohol-re-
lated traffic safety problems,1 ' but do not specifically mandate
the utilization of sobriety checkpoint programs.3 19 Therefore, a
314. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989). See
supra notes 51-56.
315. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1393, 1397-
98. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
316. Commonwealth v. Trumble, 483 N.E.2d 1102, 1105-06 (Mass. 1985). See supra
note 81. State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 663 P.2d 992, 999 (Ariz. 1983) (Feldman,
J., specially concurring). See supra note 123.
317. See supra note 112 (intrastate legislation to prevent motorist from encounter-
ing roadblocks in several municipalities during a single trip).
318. 23 U.S.C. § 402 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See supra notes 137-45 and accompa-
nying text.
319. 23 U.S.C. § 402 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See supra note 143 and accompanying
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state's receipt of any federal highway grant should be condi-
tioned on its operation of a state-wide sobriety checkpoint
program.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, declaring that sobriety checkpoint programs do
not violate the fourth amendment, reconciles the divergent ap-
proaches utilized by state courts and begins to establish a con-
stitutional standard. However, the Court should have expanded
its decision by including standardized sobriety checkpoint pro-
gram guidelines to facilitate constitutionally permissible pro-
grams. Further, to insure implementation of the programs, the
legislature should mandate the establishment of sobriety check-
point programs as incentives for receiving highway grants. The
foregoing suggestions will help to insure that sobriety checkpoint
programs will be effectively integrated into the fabric of Ameri-
can society and hopefully save lives.
Janice A. Willner*
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